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Forms and Functions: Life-Anatomy or Physiology?
Explicit Definition: To maintain consistency and coherence of thought within this text
all uses of the term “form” should be taken as; “Shape, arrangement of parts, visible
aspect (esp. apart from colour).”1 This connotation of form is only to be understood
as outward appearance or constitution of material entities. In no way is form to be
taken in the Aristotelian, Platonic, or any philosophical sense; but as an aggregate of
parts in functional relation to the environment. Any use of the term ‘form’ in quoted
texts that does not reflect this usage will be changed by the author to essence, and
will be annotated with an * and referenced in the footnotes.
Introduction to the Distinction
All forms of human centered communication are metaphors for experience.
Humans use metaphors in an attempt to communicate internal concepts and
connections of experience to others. Prelingual humans communicated past
experience through the presence of physical markers which represented the
experience of others. Before humans could speak, others’ experience was represented
metaphorically through paths worn by travel. A well-traveled path represented a
desirable experience; water, food, shelter. Later in human history experience was
metaphorized in pictograph form. Conveying experience imperative to existence like
hunting grounds and practices. As human culture progressed so did systems of
metaphors used to analogize experience and convey internal content others.

1

(Fowler & Fowler, p. 448)
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“Through analogies, the ‘invisible becomes visible,’ said Paracelsus2. For the
resemblances are neither useless nor unwarranted.”3 To understand the world we are
a

part

of,

humans

attempt

to

systematize

metaphors

used

to

convey

conceptualizations of experience for a more coherent world view. The most
structured system of metaphors is science. A problem with contemporary science is it
seems to forget that theories used to explain phenomena of life and experience are
inherently metaphoric. Theories are not actual representations of phenomena present
to experience, they are an attempt to communicate abstracted experience and
expected regularity. “We have become so used to the atomistic machine view; the
world that originated with Descartes that we have forgotten that it is a metaphor. We
no longer think as Descartes did that the world is like a clock. We think it is a clock.”4
To better understand the experienced world, it is imperative to examine the cycles of
thought that were contingent on preferred metaphoric description of the time they
emerged. “In the study of living beings, history displays a pendulum movement,
swinging to and fro between the continuous and the discontinuous, between structure
and function, between the identity of phenomena and the diversity of beings.”5
Webster and Goodwin assert; “A requirement for any experimental or
theoretical work in a science is an adequate conceptualization of the object or the
domain

in

which

a

phenomenon

occurs.”6

Terminology

used

to

aid

in

conceptualization of scientific concepts has an effect in dictating understanding of a
concept as well as epistemic tools and goals. “Modes of description and theoretical
2

th

Paracelsus was a 16 century physician known for founding the science of toxicology
(Jacob, p. 21)
4
(Lewontin, p. 14)
5
(Jacob, p. 16)
6
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 15)
3
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explanation are conditioned by the ontological and epistemological theories which are
available or fashionable and any conceptual system represents a historical choice
from a number of possibilities.”7 Historical choice of ontological and epistemic tools,
can be correlated to dominant social, political, and cultural predilection of the time
in which a concept emerged.
Evolution of meaning of organismic life, and metaphors used to describe it have
been examined by philosophers of science such as Georges Canguilhem who,
“Spotlighted the discontinuities in the conceptualization of life from antiquity to
present, tracing life as animation, life as mechanism, life as organization, and finally,
life as information.”8 Metaphors used to describe organisms and their processes have
gone through varying incarnations. Humans have a tendency to conceptualize complex
phenomenon in language that is culturally relevant. Use of culturally relevant
terminology can lend itself to greater conceptualization not only in the scientific
community but in society as a whole.
What is relevant to society becomes not only the metaphor of scientific
explanation but also provides the goal of science, inherent in the metaphor.
Metaphors used to frame a scientific problem also outline expected knowledge that
can be garnered through experimentation. An example being; description of genetic
material being dubbed the genetic code, implicitly leads to a goal of deciphering the
code. Scientific metaphors use culturally relevant terminology to outline goals of
science that are pertinent to culture during that time.

7
8

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 15)
Georges Canguilhem, “Epistemology of Biology,” 1994; as cited in (Kay, p. 40)
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An ineffable experience, thus concept, is life. Life cannot be simply defined
though descriptions and criteria to accurately represent phenomenon. It is of no
surprise attempts to do so require some amount of abstraction. Depending on choice
of abstraction; it leads to an overemphasis of one aspect of the phenomenon, while
ignoring another. In the science of life two chosen emphases are mechanism and
vitalism, nature and nurture, the list of dichotomies describing life and its process
could continue. Theories concerning organismal development as presented in the
vitalist view of Weismann and the mechanistic perspective of Wolpert, as discussed
later, are theories that would appear to be contradictory but are both accepted
biological generalizations, laws, within contemporary biology. With an analysis of
underlying historical discontinuities in biology an understanding can be explicated of
how the nature versus nurture dichotomy continues to be present in modern biology.
Susan Oyama has lead the call from developmental system theorists (DST) to
eliminate dichotomous views in biology. DST is; “a general theoretical perspective on
development, heredity and evolution. It is intended to facilitate the study of
interactions between the many factors that inﬂuence development without reviving
‘dichotomous’ debates over nature or nurture, gene or environment, biology or
culture.”9

Overall the scientific community is in agreement that life and

development of organisms is interactional. Genetic interacts with environmental
influences for organismal organization; but beating the dead horse of the nature
versus nurture dichotomy continues, due to contemporary conceptual frame of
‘biological information’ and conceptual history of Western thought. Oyama states she;

9

(Griffiths & Gray, p. 417)
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“Would like nothing better than to stop beating him,10 but every time I
think I am free of him he kicks me and does rude things to the
intellectual and political environment. He seems to be a phantom horse
with a thousand incarnations, and he gets more and more subtle each
time around…What we need here, to switch metaphors in midstream, is
the stake-in-the-heart move, and the heart is the notion that some
influences are more equal than others, that essence*, or its modern
agent, information, exists before the interactions in which it appears
and must be transmitted to the organism either through genes or by the
environment. This supports and requires just the conceptions of dual
developmental processes that make up the nature-nurture complex.
Compromises

don’t

help

because

they

don’t

alter

this

basic

assumption”11
Science cannot stop beating the dead horse of the nature versus nurture
dichotomy, because it is not dead it has been unknowingly resuscitated through
attempts to extinguish it. Through a continued cycle of emphasis on mechanistic or
vitalistic attributes of life, the nature versus nature dichotomy has thrived in
different permutations depending on choice of popular science and intellectual
traditions of the time. The trajectory of contemporary science is not that of
narrowing epistemic practices to produce objective facts. The trajectory of science is
a choice made through influence of what is relevant to society and the science is

10

Stop beating the “dead horse”
*Original text states form in place of essence.
11
(Oyama, pp. 26-27)
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emerging in. This has led to a hazy conceptualization of complex processes involved in
ontogeny, reasserting a dichotomous view that the vitalistic aspects of life are
somehow set apart from physical mechanistic actualization.
A science in desperate need of a conceptual, thus metaphoric, realignment is
biology. Biology is the study of life. To illustrate need for a realignment of biology,
two accepted descriptions of criteria of life will be examined. Then a historical
perspective concerning intellectual climates that have continued the conceptual
disconnect of organismal life will be analyzed. The two most recent illustrations of
conceptual bifurcation of life; biological specificity and biological information will
illustrate implications of this division. Lastly a structuralist account of biological life
will be explicated in a hope that it will align with goals of developmental biology as
outlined by proponents of the movement diverging from classical views of biological
science, developmental systems theory.
Defining Life
The opening line of a college level introductory biology textbook states; “An
organism is a life-form―a living entity made up of one or more cells. Although there is
no simple definition of life that is endorsed by all biologists, most agree that
organisms share a suite of five fundamental characteristics.”12 The five characteristics
outlined in this text are; energy, cells, information, replication, and evolution. Energy
is the attribute of life to account for need to acquire and use energy from
environmental

sources;

provided

to

photosynthesizing

organisms

through

photosynthesis and its necessary component processes, non-photosynthesizing
12

(Freeman, p. 1) *The following summary of the five characteristics are the author’s; description in full on pages
1-2 of the text.
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organisms through cellular metabolization13 and its necessary components. Cells are
units that constitute organisms or a colony,14 that exhibit organization or order bound
by semi-permeable membranes that permit passing of nutrients and energy to the
inner constitution. Information is both transgenerational and environmental factors in
which cellular organization occurs. Replication is a philosophically and scientifically
fuzzy matter, this text uses an interesting metaphor stated by François Jacob to
conceptualize the point; “The dream of a bacterium is to become two bacteria.”15
Evolution is given an unsatisfactory tautologous description; “Organisms are the
product of evolution, and their populations continue to evolve.”16 With such a
nonconcrete description of life, it is understandable not all biologist agree on a
definition of object of their study, life.
The second description is also taken from a college level introductory biology
text published a year earlier than the first. Considering that these texts are
contemporary, aimed at the same audience, and have a goal of systemizing thought; a
hope would be that their conceptual content concerning the most basic principle
would correlate well. The second text does not acknowledge incomplete agreement
of specialists in the field of biology concerning definition and description of life. The
text introduces the subject of life boldly stating; “All living things share five basic
properties passed down over millions of years from the first organisms to evolve on
earth: Cellular organization, metabolism, homeostasis, growth and reproduction, and

13

Metabolization-act of metabolizing; all the chemical reactions occurring in a living cell or organism
Colony-An assemblage of individuals. May refer to an assemblage of semi-independent cells or to a breeding
population of multicellular organisms. (Freeman, p. G:7)
15
(Freeman, p. 2)
16
(Freeman, p. 2)
14

8|Payne

heredity.”17 One aspect of life that can be agreed upon between these two texts18 is
that there are five attributes of a living system. They do not use the same
terminology, but possibly the terms correlate?
In text B cellular organization refers to organization of multicellular organisms
or in a single celled organism. This feature of life correlates to text A’s second
criteria of life, cells. The important similarity of organization in these two
descriptions of cells, is that of the semipermeable membrane. The important
distinction between these attributes that illustrates discontinuities within biology is
that A’s definition requires “cells” not “cell” constitute life. While most unicellular
organisms live as a group or colony; description A does not include a single celled
organism as “alive” without assemblage of other individuals. By not allowing an
individual single celled organism as possessing life, text A appears to be privileging
the role of function over form. In the opening of text A it is granted that a single cell
is an organism and a life form, the criteria requires multiple cells for function of life.
In A’s formulation a singular cell cannot function alone to constitute the form life;
whereas text B view a single celled organism as fulfilling the form of life and
functions. While descriptions of cells juxtaposed with cellular organization seem to
share important similarities when describing life; there is still a conceptual disconnect
between formulations of life by experts in the field of biology.
Metabolism is the second criteria within text B, and can be correlated to text
A’s first criteria of energy. There are no obvious discrepancies in conceptualization of
17

Emphasis in original text (Johnson & Losos, p. 3) The five attributes are summarized by the author; full
description in text p. 3.
18
For ease of comparison between texts the first text analyzed, Freeman, will be referred to text A and the second,
Johnson will be referred to as text B.
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this attribute, just an interesting distinction of conceptual priority. Energy is input
and output of the mechanism of metabolism. Text A emphasizes vitalistic function,
where text B emphasizes form or mechanism supporting function. While seemingly
similar metabolism and energy as a criteria for life, highlight different aspects of this
phenomenon. This foreshadows later discussion concerning historical intellectual
climates that have influenced contemporary science.
The third criteria of text B is homeostasis; “All living things maintain stable
internal conditions so their complex processes can be better coordinated.”19 This is an
important element of life’s processes that cannot be directly correlated to any
criteria in text A. All cellular processes are regulated by what is analogized in science
as negative feedback.20 The environment induces stress and change on an organismal
system, and the system responds to maintain stable internal conditions, to continue
life.
The fourth criteria of text B is growth and reproduction; “All things grow and
reproduce.” The fourth criteria of text A replication somewhat correlates with this
principle. There are discrete and contested differences between the terms replication
and reproduction that go beyond aim of this text. For this purpose it will be accepted
that replication and reproduction carry a close enough conceptual resemblance. What
is of import is text A’s oversight of growth. A possible reason may be in line with text
A’s preference towards functions of life over forms in which it presents itself.

19

(Johnson & Losos, p. 2)
Negative Feedback-A self-limiting, corrective response in which a deviation in some variable (e.g., body
temperature, blood PH, concentration of some compound) triggers responses aimed at returning the variable to
normal. (Freeman, p. G:20)

20
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The fifth criteria of text B is heredity. In this text heredity is discussed
completely in terms of the genetic system, specifically the DNA molecule. This can be
correlated to criteria four of A, information. While they are correlated; there is a
distinct conceptual difference between information as posed in text A, and heredity
in text B exclusively related to molecular DNA. Information in text A accounts for
environmental and hereditary influences on life and development. Heredity in text B
only accounts for molecular form, subjugating function of the molecule to its form.
Text B does not include evolution as a criteria for life, as text A does. Evolution
is acknowledged previous to enumerating the properties shared by life. This could be
because of assumptions behind evolution are difficult to analogize without falling into
empty tautologous statements, as text A did. Another reason may be related to
seemingly differing emphases between texts on either form or function of life.
Evolution is a function of life, not a form of life.
An interesting note about text A, is what is introduced in the description but
not in the criteria is evolution. It also does not mention homeostasis as criteria or
within the initial description. This puts an overall presupposition on group or external
dynamic of the life. What is mentioned in text B’s introduction but not in the criteria,
is the individual entity has autonomy of life within the system. The emphasis is on
internal members of the system as representative of life. Overall text A appears to be
concerned with what can be construed or distinguished as functions of forms of life, it
places physiology over anatomy. Whereas text B emphasizes forms that convey the
functions, physiology is subjugated to anatomy. Biology is in need of a conceptual
realignment to agree on object of their inquiry; what is life?

11 | P a y n e

A second imperative question facing biology, is development of an organism.
The question of development is of an individual organism, as well as development of
species through evolutionary time for actualization of an individual. These two texts
illustrate how descriptions and prioritization of form or function, as guiding principle,
can translate into other conceptual difficulties. It can be agreed upon that
development of an organism plays a role in life, but this role can be framed with an
emphasis on either form or function.
Text A describes development as; “The entire series of events that occurs
between the fertilization and maturity is called development. During development,
cells become progressively more specialized or differentiated.”21 These are functions
of development, specialization and differentiation. There is no discussion of forms of
anatomical components that actualize this function.
Text B describes development within an organismal system as; “An individual
develops as cells divide, move, or expand in a directed way; begin to express certain
genes rather than others; and signal to each other about where they are, what they
are doing, and what type of cell they are becoming. In addition selected cells die in a
regulated manner during development.”22 This text emphasizes physical entities and
relationship that constitute function of development. This description discusses a
particular gene23 being expressed over another. Genes are loosely associated to
physical structures within DNA. Also type of cell is accentuated in this description,

21

(Johnson & Losos, p. 449)
(Freeman, p. 375)
23
Gene- A section of DNA (or RNA, in some viruses) that encodes information for building one or more related
polypeptides or functional RNA molecules along with the regulatory sequences required for its transcription.
(Freeman, p. G:12)
22
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placing primacy on anatomical forms that give actualization of function and
development.
An explication of these two contemporary biological texts, illustrates the
contemporary conceptual bifurcation of the object of study life and development.
This shows how when systemized metaphors are attempted in science, there is a
necessary abstraction of phenomenon for it to be represented.

Abstraction of

phenomenon puts an emphasis on either vitalistic functions of organisms and their
physiology, or on mechanistic forms of organismal anatomy. To develop a more
coherent conceptualization of the phenomenon of life it is necessary to analyze this
bifurcation and historical climates that have reified, and thus lead to this distinction
of form or function, anatomy or physiology as holding primacy in life.
The Development of Life’s History
The problem that can be loosely described as that of nature versus nurture has
persisted for millennia in Western thought. The seeming necessity to give a privileged
role to either external or internal leads to the requirement of a central directing
agency of development informing an organism either within organismic DNA or from
the external environment directing organization from outside in. The requirement of
a fruitful science is an adequate conceptualization of phenomenon attempting to be
explained. To understand conceptual missteps within biology it is necessary to
examine historical ideas that informed contemporary conceptualization of the object
of biology, life.
The distinction between vitalism and mechanism, epigenesis and preformation,
holism and atomism, nature and nurture can be traced as far back in Western thought

13 | P a y n e

as Democritus and Aristotle. “The Greeks laid one of the main foundations of Western
culture. The first traces of vitalism and mechanism can already be found in their
philosophy of nature. While Democritus proposed an atomistic theory, his opponent
Aristotle formulated a holistic and teleological24 philosophy of nature.”25 What these
longstanding distinctions have in common is that they are in reference to life,
thought, or knowledge but put an emphasis on either vitalistic internal self-directed
organization system dictating function of an entity, or on mechanistic physical form in
which function is processed. A popular metaphor in circulation currently is that of
input and output in relation to a computer; mechanistic thought would explain all
forms of the system composing function, vitalists would explain the system in terms of
overall function guiding interaction of forms.
Biology has been influenced by two differing modes of theory, vitalism and
mechanism, which have taken different incarnations over history, dependent on
popular ideas of the time. When science is emphasizing the vitalistic aspects of life,
the object of inquiry is the vitalizing force, the essential characteristic of life. In the
vitalistic perspective, “A conception of a whole in which the parts have no autonomy
or intrinsic properties, their nature following from that of the whole as the expression
of some ‘central’ unifying or directing agency, usually conceived as being nonmaterial, an ‘Idea’ or ‘soul.’”26
Aristotle was one of the first philosophers of Western thought that there is
extant evidence of philosophy he espoused. His philosophy has been influential
24

Teleology-The philosophical theory that all things in nature have a purpose and happen because of that. (Fowler
& Fowler, p. 938)
25
(De Klerk, p. 3)
26
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 16)
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through history and continuing into contemporary times. “In the Middle Ages
Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy provided the unifying framework, which was
marvelously suited to the description of living beings in terms of teleology and
wholeness.”27 Vital essence which is described in Aristotelian philosophy places an
emphasis on function of life and its entities as a defining characteristic. Inchoate
matter was informed by a vital force.

Physical forms of organisms were of only

secondary study to the function that they exhibited. The atomistic parts of organisms
are present but the function that they display is object of study.
The view of development and organismal genesis in the Aristotelian view is
epigenesis. “The epigenist assumed a vital force by virtue of which the organism
obtained its different organs during a formative and teleologically directed process of
growth.”28 It was a directing force that was internal to the actualized organism that is
responsible for epigenesis. The non-material guiding entity of an organism is
responsible for presence and functions of life. It is through necessary functions of life
for which physical manifestation of form actualizes itself.
The opposing emphasis of a mechanistic nature can be seen in the philosophy
of Democritus as; “A conception positing atomic events together with the
‘mechanical’

interaction

of

autonomous

units

possessing

certain

intrinsic

properties.”29 This view can be seen back to antiquity in the atomist philosophy of
Democritus. It is physical three dimensional units interacting in nature, form, which
defines functions within the physical world. This places an emphasis on external

27

(De Klerk, p. 1)
(De Klerk, p. 7)
29
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 16)
28
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qualities of parts of the system, prominence is on the external as a unifying directing
force. It is the boundary in which parts interact that primacy lies in the mechanistic
formulation of life.
The developmental and genesis of organisms in a preformationists view is; “A
germ contains each part of the body in miniature; each part simply grows and nothing
new appears.” This formation of development and genesis presupposes an importance
on a central directing agent that is external to the individual atomistic part. Physical
components of organisms express life inherently. There is not an essence internal to
the organism as a singular presence that allows for presentation of an individual, each
component part has its own nature and amalgamation of parts that presents the
function. As far back as ancient Greece bifurcation of form or function as
representation of organismal life has been present, and re-presents its self in varying
manifestations through history of Western thought.
An important indication of continued bifurcation of the conceptualization of
life; can be seen in what Webster and Goodwin refer to as “German idealism” which
is reflected in philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and “Protestant Natural Theology” as
represented by the philosophy of David Hume.30 Both philosophies have had a great
influence on Western thought. They each represent a continued tradition of placing
primacy of life on either function or the form. Kant represents the vitalist. In his
‘Critique of Judgment;’ “Kant spells out in some detail the necessity of using
teleological principles if biological organization is to be made intelligible.”31 There
must be a function for the life form to be presented. Life cannot be present just
30
31

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 22)
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 20)
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through chance, there must be a principle or function present for physical
manifestation to occur. This shows that Kant carries on the conceptual bifurcation of
life placing an emphasis on the vitalistic nature of life as the factor that dictates life.
On the other side of the fork is Natural Theology as represented by
philosophical influence of David Hume. This incarnation of metaphoric description is
aligned with mechanistic atomism of Democritus, emphasizing life conceptualized as;
“Mechanical devices; that is as functional unities in which only structural relations are
those of spatial contiguity.”32 There is no guiding purpose for formation of parts,
through their formation of physical structures function is defined.
This conceptualization of life also subjugates cause and effect to constant
conjunction of observed phenomenon. Hume’s empiricist philosophy emphasized that
only observable phenomenon could be object of scientific investigation. Cause never
can be objectively discerned, all that is experienced is a “constant conjunction of
events” that present an appearance of cause and effect. There is no cause for
organismal life beyond contingent processes in which it presents itself. “The external
functional relations of organisms considered in terms of the utility of the ‘part’ to the
organism in relation to a particular mode of life in a particular environment. Internal
functional relations, while by no means ignored, where relegated to a secondary
status.”33 For Natural Theology the directing agency of life was externally guided
through relation of physical parts, not a teleological function.
Conceptual misalignment in biology of form versus function, mechanism versus
vitalism can also be seen in two widely accepted, groundbreaking, influential theories
32
33

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 22)
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 22)
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in biology; Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. Darwin’s theory of evolution
is not based on observation of an individual or interaction of forms that produce a
function. It is based on the function of evolution directing actualization of forms,
which will provide apparatus for continued function. Darwin’s theory of evolution
caries on the vitalist tradition, placing function of phenomenon as object of study
over the form.34
Mendelian genetics posed “unit factors,”35 as responsible for organismal
development and life. Units present in parents are transferred through the act of
fertilization to provide preexisting material forms that are actualized in organismal
life. This formulation is directly correlated to ideas of preformation as seen in the
mechanistic views of Democritus. Classic Mendelian theory represents one of many
oscillations of thought from mechanism to vitalism, Mendelian genetics is a
representation of the mechanistic.
Both Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolution showed progress in
understanding complex phenomena of life and development. The Darwinian view
emphasized vitalistic functional processes as imperative for presentation of life.
Evolution became the modern conception of epigenesis; the teleological guiding force
presenting as the nonmaterial entity and function of evolution. Mendelian genetics is
inherently preformationists, thus mechanistic. Mendelian genetics accentuated
unchanging units passed from generation to generation, placing a privileged role on
preexisting material entities responsible for life and development. Though these
theories have played an imperative role in contemporary conceptualization of life,
34
35

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 23)
(Moitra, p. 7)
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they also represent two underlying presuppositions in history of biological thought;
primacy on either form and its mechanistic characteristics, or function and its
vitalistic nature.
A final example of this conceptual bifurcation can be seen in germ36 theories of
Weismann and Wolpert. With addition of microscope technology questions concerning
the nature of organismal life moved from observation of macroscopic to that of
microscopic phenomenon present at cellular level. Specifically physical entities in the
nucleus of cells and their functions were given role of transmitting life.
Friedrich Weismann represents continuation of the vitalist epigenesis tradition.
Weismann believed; “The problem of inheritance is not primarily to be thought of in
terms of how the structure of the parent is to be transmitted to the offspring, rather
it is to be considered in terms of control of growth and development.”37 The
highlighted aspect of this formulation of life and development is on function, control
and growth; it subjugates importance of structure to function. Weismann believed in
a structure within the germ cell that, “Has the power of developing into a complex
organism.”38 He acknowledges structure but places it with a power beyond its
structure.
Developmental biologist Lewis Wolpert also made investigations into germ cells
as imperative for presentation of new life. Unlike Weismann’s emphasis on
controlling functions of cellular processes responsible for life, Wolpert emphasized
spatial relations and order as presenting life. Wolpert proposed; “A co-ordinate

36

Germ-a portion of an organism capable of developing into a new one (Fowler & Fowler, p. 379)
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 27)
38
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 27)
37
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system which assigned a unique positional label to every point within it. The
boundaries of the domain were defined by external values (maxima or minima) of the
co-ordinate system, generated by a mechanism which was not specified but
assumed.”39 Director of this system was assumed as external to physical structure,
through environmental influence, not a function inherent to a structure.
Both Weismann’s and Wolpert’s descriptions of germ cells as imperative to life
and development are accepted in contemporary biology today, their theses being
quite similar but show a distinct bifurcation in primacy of either mechanistic or
vitalistic nature. Weismann’s thesis can be summarized as; “Temporally or spatially
organized variable in the external environment selected which particular set of
determinants in the germ plasm would be expressed, and hence which of the possible
alternative forms would be produced.”40 This formulation highlights a persistence of
determinants in germ plasm that are triggered through environmental interaction to
produce an organism. Form is selected through a function of interaction of
environment and germ. Wolpert’s thesis can be summarized as; “Spatially organized
variable in the internal environment (positional information) determines which
particular set of genes in each member of a (necessarily) spatially distributed set of
genomes will be expressed and hence, ultimately, which component part of the total
form will be realized in that part of space.”41 Wolpert accentuates physical structure
and location as object of investigation, showing a preference for mechanistic form
over vitalistic function.

39

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 36)
Emphasis present in original text (Webster & Goodwin, p. 36)
41
Emphasis present in original text (Webster & Goodwin, p. 36)

40
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The way in which phenomenon is described places a primacy on either vitalistic
or mechanistic attributes of life. The formulation of description provides the grid to
which explanation is pinned. Metaphors used in a theory dictate observations which
are deemed relevant. “In the dialogue between theory and experience, theory always
has the first word. It determines the form of the question and thus sets limits to the
answer.”42 Depending on theories espoused by popular science of the time, an
emphasis is given to the mechanistic or vitalistic nature of life which outlines what
phenomena can be object of investigation. The object of investigation dictates
answers one is searching for.
Informing Information
Currently biological information is the chosen metaphor to describe
phenomenon of life. The term information has been in common usage for centuries
typically taken to mean; “Formation of mind and character, instruction and
communicated knowledge.”43 This term was not used with scientific precision, but as
a term to denote ineffable experiences of personal and cultural development that are
imperative to human. Information is a somewhat empty metaphor, a catachresis, a
signifier without a referent. If metaphors attempt to communicate internal states and
expected regularity, any communication verbal or nonverbal could be construed as
information. Even further, chemical signals such as pheromones44 that are not directly
perceptible to experience could be deemed information. Anything internal or external
to the system that stimulates perception and experience could be information.
42

(Jacob, p. 15)
(Kay, p. 77)
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Pheromone-a chemical substance produced by an organism in order to attract others of the same species,
especially for reproductive purposes (Freeman, p. G:22)
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In the late 1940’s two mathematicians Warren Weaver and Claude Shannon
both introduced their theory of communication and information into discourse of
science. This discipline was designed to formulate more efficient telephone systems,
with the goal of transferring “information” through telephone wires.45 Warren Weaver
introduced the term information into his theory with a definition differing from
commonsense usage of the term.

Information was; “The capacity of a system to

transmit any sequence of symbols depended solely on distinguishing at the receiving
end between the results of various selections made at the sending end-not on the
meanings of these sequences.”46 This means that for any system with an input and an
output, where it can be discerned by output that there has been changes in input of
the system. Weaver is quoted as saying, “The word ‘information’ in this theory
[mathematical theory of communication] is used in a special sense that must not be
confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused with
meaning.”47 Information is a functional relationship that is not dependent on the
medium which it is produced.
Another application of the metaphor information to describe complex dynamic
systems came about in the late 1940s from Norbert Wiener in cybernetics, a
formalized notion of feedback. “Wiener transformed Schrödinger’s statistical
mechanical arguments into an information discourse encompassing all self-regulating
systems.”48 Weiner believed that information could be calculated as negative entropy.
Information being the metaphor for organismal organization. Weaver and Shannon on
45
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the other hand argued that information within a system could be calculated as
entropy. If one could discern disorder of a system then organization would be the
inverse. Weiner argued; “Just as the amount of information in a system is a measure
of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of
disorganization; and one is simply the negative of the other.”49 There seemed to be
no difficulty with this for either mathematician or use within biology, it was seen as
somewhat a mathematical pun. 50
Because of the theoretical definition of information within the mathematical
theory of communication and cybernetics, it seemed unproblematic to add it to the
concepts of biology. Information carried by organisms could be discerned by regularity
of offspring’s appearance being similar to the parent. In the Late 1950s mechanisms
of phage replication as described by Delbrück and Gunther Stent, believed as many
molecular biologist did “it would be unwise not (to) [sic] give some currency to
‘information transfer’ as a possible replication mechanism.”51 This consideration
heralded shift again to an emphasis on vitalistic characteristics of life.
Biology has traditionally not been seen as an exact science such as physics or
chemistry. It was only in decades after World War II that information became for the
first time a “physical parameter and a precisely defined concept”52 Information as
relating to discourse of biology emerged in an attempt to unify biology with sciences
that showed a greater ability to make systematic and quantifiable theories, thus
predictions. What is important to recognize about this choice of appropriation of
49

Norbert Weiner, Cybernetics; 1961, p. 11 as cited in (Kay, p. 85)
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metaphor, is that information places an emphasis on internal vitalistic function of the
system, as opposed to mechanical form of the system that actualizes function.
The positive of this nonconcrete metaphor, is that it leant toward the goal of a
unified science. Formulas derived from the mathematic theory of communication
could be applied to model other systems. Formulas of the mathematic theory of
communication greatly improved computer modeling and cybernetics. It would not be
far for biology to reach out to this new discipline in an attempt to describe
interactions within complex biological systems. Members of biological sciences who
originally embraced this term understood its metaphoric value, and did not intend
reinstantiating the idea of a vitalistic force in contemporary biology.
What can be extrapolated from use of information within scientific lexicon is
that information is the function of organisms and their interactions. It does not place
any emphasis on content or physical form that carries information, only order of a
system. Biological discourse framed on information shows the continued pendulum of
scientific investigation swinging towards vitalistic description of life and its processes.
Power of the biological system became metaphorized as a nonconcrete entity
providing order, an unseen directing power on the physical form.
The Space of Specificity
Previous to addition of biological information to the scientific lexicon biological
phenomena was described using the metaphor of specificity. Biological specificity is
related to corresponding or complementary spatial configurations between biological
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systems.53 Specificity was conceptually grounded through the traditional lock and key
model where a key/organism is constructed to fit a lock/environment. The lock and
key model of specificity is a simplification, as any abstraction of phenomena. What is
lacking in the traditional lock and key model is dynamic vitalistic interaction between
systems or parts of systems that relate to produce complex biological phenomena
inherent in specificity as defined by developmental biologist Paul Weiss.
Paul Weiss gave an in depth description of phenomena that can be tied
conceptually to the term specificity, and attempted to tie terminology and
phenomena in biology to known phenomena in the realm of physical and chemical
science. “We must treat cells as physical systems in space and time, endowed with
definable properties which are subject to the limitations of all physical bodies and
their laws of behavior.”54 Weiss’ object of study was the cellular level, but his
description of specificity based on “molecular ecology”55 can be extended to larger
systems. This elegant ten point description of interactions within biological systems
can be conceptually correlated to the dynamic interaction that is biological specificity
in the development of organisms and their environment.
“The concept formulated in these ten points takes into account the
growing realization that the structural and working order of the cell is
based not on the presence of a fixed mechanical framework pervading it
abundantly disproved by the facts but on a regular distribution in space
of the various intracellular processes: a dynamic rather than static
53
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Molecular ecology is an attempt to interpret cellular affinities in terms of molecular structure and organization.
(Weiss, p. 252)
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skeleton, maintained by metabolic energy and determined in its
characteristics by some definite geometrical order in the field of its
operation.”56
The ten points are summarized, including mechanistic implications as follows; 57
1. Each system is made of numerous types of species of different composition, size,
densities, rank and stability. Some segments of a system occur in relatively constant
symbiotic groupings. Species are described completely by their physical and chemical
composition. Some species interact in a relatively constant manner due to their
physical and chemical constitution being complementary. This description of
interaction is completely mechanistic, atomic parts interact within the environment
and because of this interaction of parts, function emerges.
2. One of the fundamental characteristics of a system is that various species of the
system are not self-sufficient, but are dependent in various degrees on other
members of the population, as well as physical conditions within space they occupy.
Survival and function of the system is predicated on presence of all necessary species.
A system cannot consist of only a single species. It is necessary for survival of the
system for species to interact within physical space. From the presence of physical
species dependent upon each other a function emerges from interaction of parts. A
mechanism must have a variety of cogs and wheels for a function to arise.
3. Interactions between species only occur within a limited range of conditions
specific for its kind. These conditions are “existential and operational prerequisites”58
56

(Weiss, p. 255)
Ten points summarized by author, substituting the term system for cell, complete description in endnotes
(Weiss, pp. 252-255)
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for each species or group. Existential and operational prerequisites of a species,
refers to spatial configuration of a given environment59

as well as chemical

composition of the environment. A species cannot exist in a system without already
existent chemical configuration and gradation. DNA only maintains its structure in
specific conditions with an addition of heat or chemicals it becomes denatured. This
is what is meant by existential and operational prerequisites; already present
chemical and physical conditions which attract a diversity of species necessary for the
system’s operation. The use of existential and operational prerequisites, is a purely
mechanistic description.
4. If specific existential and operational prerequisites for various species differ at
different sites within the system, species will automatically segregate into their
appropriate environment. Due to environmental affinity an indiscriminate mixture of
species can be sorted into a definite spatial pattern. Due to already existent
conditions of the environment in which a system is instantiated, species will segregate
appropriately to their preferences. Cogs and other parts of a clock automatically
segregate depending on fit and preference of interaction. The mechanism self
organizes, the emphasis is on the parts.
5. The fifth criteria clearly summarizes earlier criteria giving more description to
interactions of species from the micro order to the macro, and cannot be summarized
with justice.
“While the conditions and forces which determine the molecular
regrouping are of the most diverse sorts; electric charges, surface

59

Environment in this context is any physical, chemical, spatial or temporal contingency within the system.
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tensions, coacervation60, solubility, chemical affinities, adsorption,
enzyme-substrate relations, mobility, elasticity, etc.-their resultant in
each case is of such character as to insure relative stability of
composition, density, and localization of the given group of species. As
they combine, larger units of supramolecular, submicroscopic, and
finally, of microscopic order arise, each durable or "viable" only in a
particular typical constellation of conditions.”61
Species within a system interact to form larger systems. Systems on a cellular level
form tissues, which form organs, then organisms, populations, and eventually
ecosystems, each durable or "viable" only in a particular typical functional relational
set of conditions. Levels of mechanistic complexity emerge through atomistic
interaction.
6. Organization in space and content of the system and its constituents set the frame
for later settlement of different members of species, giving existential and
operational prerequisites of new members of the system. Organization is based on all
surfaces and interfaces of constituents of a system. External aspects of species of a
system and their interaction define function of the system, and exclusion or inclusion
of new species to the mechanism of the system.
7. A given boundary/surface62 of a system will favor integration of particular species
that will concentrate that area and crowd out other species not equally fit to that

60

Coacervation- a tiny spherical droplet of assorted organic molecules which is held together by hydrophobic
forces from a surrounding liquid. (Freeman, p. G:6)
61
(Weiss, p. 253)
62
Not necessarily boundary or surface of the entire system but the boundary or surface of the constituents of the
system or of the entire system.
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system. Surfaces of the mechanistic species favor integration of species that fit within
physical chemical and spatial organization already present.
8. Surface species of a system have a unique role in determining events within its
interior; “They assume the functional properties of membranes”63. Species control
and select transfer of substances between systems they divide. Through aggregation
of mechanistic components function rises out of the system.
9. Boundary/surface species will become fixed into an interface, and force a definite
orientation relative to that interface below its surface. This will form an orderly array
to which layers within the interior can become fixed. A stacking up process is initiated
through which organization can be gradually extended into the interior, creating an
increasing diversity of conditions as it proceeds. Function of the system emerges
through organization from the external stable appearance, to internal interplay of
mechanisms.
10. If conditions change along the boundary/surface so that they are no longer
compatible with existential and operational prerequisites of the boundary/ surface
species, a new assortment of species better fitted to the situation will take position
as the interface that will set new organization for the interior, leading to an alternate
fate of the system. When enough pressure is applied to a system, a watch for
example, the systems environmental conditions change no longer fulfilling existential
and operational conditions. In this system parts of the watch once disengaged would
regroup with other mechanisms to form other systems; possibly aggregate with other
mechanisms to form more watches, or to become mechanisms within a radio.

63

(Weiss, p. 254)
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While the ten points formulated attempt to provide a non-anthropomorphic
based description of phenomena, describing interaction in a mechanistic and
atomistic way, leads to the system being directed from outside. The boundary
determines membership into the system. Placing emphasis entirely on mechanical
aspects of life; leads to the need to assert a central directing agency dependent on
the form of life, not function. The pendulum of science again shifted to an atomistic
mechanistic view of life with introduction of specificity to the scientific lexicon.
“Thus with the start of the nineteenth century, a new science was to appear. Its aim
was no longer to classify organisms, but to study the processes of life; its object of
investigation was no longer the visible structure, but organization.”64 Discourse of
organization was to discover “life’s grand design.”65 With organization being object of
study, specificity was an important tool in understanding organization. Problems and
experiments of the 1930s and 1940s were framed in discourse of functional
specificities.66 “Specificities dictated and governed successive cycles of life.”67
Specificity of structures interacting to form organized biological organisms was the
space for scientific advancement and understanding.
“Experimental studies showed that genes were highly specific with
respect to gene products; enzymes exhibited a high degree of specificity
for their substrates; the binding of antigen and antibody became an
index of specificity in immunology and related fields; bacteria and
viruses where often characterized with respect to their host-range
64
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65

30 | P a y n e

specificities;

taxonomies

of

species

were

established

based

on

experimentally measured serological68 differences.”69
Proteins became focus of biological investigation, as imperative players in
organization of complex organisms. The question of how biological specificity was
transmitted across generations focused on proteins as bearer of specificity. “Of all
the macro- and microelements conjoined in the organization of perpetuation of the
body, proteins came first, privileged as the ontological substance of life. As the
material representatives of heredity, at least until the early 1950s, they bore
biological and chemical specificity.”70 Previous to discoveries of DNA as the selfreplicating molecule, proteins were thought to hold secrets of organizational
specificity, thus secrets of life. “Across the life sciences, the lock-and-key metaphor
served as an exchange medium, a conceptual and experimental bridge, which related
form to function along the material continuum of biological specificity, from species
to molecule.”71
While language of specificity had mechanistic conceptual backing, it did not
provide an explanation for biological processes, just abstracted conceptualization of
the processes. “In many instances the term specificity possessed more of a
metaphorical quality and heuristic value than operational force. Unless detailed
through some kind of concrete structure, measure, mechanism, and experimental
procedure, specificity was not really an explanation (explanan) but that which needed
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explaining (explnandum).”72 Specificity may have required an explanation, but there
was an agreed upon physical description of the lock and key which provided it with
conceptual backing.
Metaphoric language is necessary for formation of conceptual problems.
Language to describe a problem cannot be seen also as its answer. “The main
objection to symbolic expressions of this kind comes from the fact that instead of
formulating the problems, they merely label them. We may not be able to dispense
with such descriptive terms for some time to come, but we must guard against giving
them any explanatory value.”73 Mysteries of life and experience are not locks and
keys but appearance of biological components complimentary interaction can be
conceptualized in a way that resembles a lock and key. Describing interactions of life
through a mechanistic view of specificity, leads to the assumption that function of a
system naturally arise from the atomic parts. This leaves an emphasis on a directing
force external to the parts. A description is given of the system, but there is still a
nonmaterial entity directing assemblage of the system from outside, as opposed to
nonmaterial information internal to the system.
Developmental Systems Theory; A Structured View of Life
In 1986, Arbib and Hesse asserted, “Scientific revolutions are, in fact,
metaphoric revolutions, and theoretical explanations should be seen as metaphoric
redescription of the domain and phenomena.”74 An attempt to understand complex
biological systems has continually lead to conceptual bifurcation, asserting two
72
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separate streams directing the organism, discussed earlier as vitalism or mechanism,
function or form, information or specificity. A description is needed to capture both
mechanistic and vitalistic nature of biological phenomenon. Susan Oyama has lead the
call from developmental system theorists (DST) to eliminate dichotomous views in
biology. DST is; “a general theoretical perspective on development, heredity and
evolution. It is intended to facilitate the study of interactions between the many
factors that inﬂuence development without reviving ‘dichotomous’ debates over
nature or nurture, gene or environment, biology or culture.”75
Advocates of DST believe the organism and the environment it is a part of have
equal influence on development. The object of investigation should be the
“developmental system,” the organism rooted within developmental context of the
environment.76 Concepts and terminology used to describe theories concerning life
and heritability have evolved through history, and are described through either
mechanistic or vitalistic metaphors that are culturally relevant for the time.
Proponents of DST would like to eliminate conceptual dichotomies in science and
society as a whole. The first step to eliminate dichotomous ideas, is a recognition of
the continued presence and varying incarnations of dichotomies. Webster and
Goodwin discuss a structuralist approach to description and theorizing concerning
organisms, which possibly could be in line with stated goals of DST to eliminate this
conceptual discrepancy.

75
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33 | P a y n e

“Structuralism is concerned with order, its generation and transformation it
rejects both atomism and holism.”77 This does not entail that structuralist approach
to organismal life rejects epistemic contributions of science. It does entail a differing
conceptualization of organismal domain and life. Forms and functions of life deserve
equal weight in theoretical description, as they are inseparable aspects of the same
whole. Science cannot continue beating the dead horse of nature and nurture, genes
and environment, mechanism and vitalism. All of these concepts are two sides of the
same coin, life, they cannot be separated. When an attempt to separate or place
primacy of action on one of these aspects, it leads to a conceptual disconnect, which
results in an impediment to epistemic practices.
There are three aspects to the structuralist formulation of organismal life. First
wholeness; “Structures are wholes, firstly, in the sense that they have the property of
maintain themselves in being while their elements change, hence they are not
reducible to the sum of their elements.”78 This conceptualization of organisms as
structures, thus wholes, gives weight to the physical forms present. Allowing for the
incorporation of new members while old members of the structure degrade, but still
the wholeness of the structure is maintained. The function is that of being a whole
and this function is realized through the dynamic interchange of parts internal and
external to the structure.
The second aspect of organismal life from a structuralist perspective is related
to transformations. “Because structures obey laws there is a restriction on the
‘coherent’ forms which are possible; that is the potential set of transformations is a
77
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logically closed set, though not necessarily finite…individual organisms can undergo
specific transformations as a consequence of internal or external perturbation.”79
There is an emphasis on restrictions of coherent form, which allows for organisms to
transform in a law governed way dependent on the set of possibilities provided by the
physiochemical constitution of both the organism and the environment at a given
time. This aspect formulates a conception of life attempting to not emphasize
external or internal directing, dictating primacy over a given life form. This aspect of
the organism and life as structure allows for both the mechanistic and vitalistic
experience of life to be accounted for.
The third aspect of organisms as structures is self-regulation. This refers to;
“The power of a structure to maintain a given member of the set of transformations
in the face of perturbation.”80 By making reference to power it implies a function, but
there is also a mention to the member, or form, in which the function is actualized.
This allows for a change in physical composition and orientation of parts of an
organism while maintaining its individual status. “Small continuous changes in
parameters can result in either small, continuous changes of form, or in large,
discontinuous alterations…”81 A caterpillar undergoes metamorphosis to a butterfly;
there is a set of structured transformations of the physical entity in which the
function of its parts alter, but still the same organism persists.
These three conceptualizations of aspects of structure, or organismic life, does
not imply a privileged role over the ever changing physical specificity of the

79

(Webster & Goodwin, p. 41)
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 41)
81
(Webster & Goodwin, p. 45)
80

35 | P a y n e

environment that which nurtures the organism, or the genetic nature of information
which is an internal function of the physical forms of the organism. “Such a
conceptualization is, of course, compatible with a variety of theories and does not
necessitate any one particular theory.”82 This formulation of organism as structure
can fit with any of the previous formulations of life as mechanistic form or vitalistic
function. It does not exclude old theories, but explicates their shortcomings, not
allowing for a view of form or function to be accentuated. The structural conception
of organisms is inherently interactional. It allows for transformation with the
appearance of constancy.
The structuralist approach to organisms rejects both atomism and holism,
vitalism and mechanism; as chosen metaphor for life. That is not to say that vitalist
and mechanistic metaphors are wrong and in need of elimination, they are in need of
integration. “Although exclusively atomistic conceptions of the organisms are
untenable, that does not mean that atomistic association plays no role in biological
phenomena: it takes its place in a larger scheme as a limiting case in which the set of
potential forms has only one member. This larger scheme is a structuralist conception
of the organism.”83 This can be construed as, the atomistic perspective is the static
synchronic state of components of a system. Mapping specific orientation of chemical
components, reducing the whole to its parts and orientation. The limiting case is the
diachronic history, or level of order, which gives rise to the synchronic. The
progression of mechanistic interaction over time dictated by physiochemical
interaction gives rise to the whole, or vitalistic aspect of life dependent on the
82
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previous state of the system. The atomic structure gives the space for function to rise
in time through minute physiochemical changes to a system.
In a given environmental space there is a set of physical members of an extant
system. All have specific chemical compositions and physical affinities. Within any
given system due to both internal and external composition, governing laws limit
actualization possible due to physiochemical relations in a particular time and place,
dependent on the previous state of the system. There is not a preexisting essence
that is in need of actualization, just physiochemical processes dependent on chance
circumstances of the environment. Organismal development is a conditional process
based on organization in physical three dimensional space progressing through time
dictated by regularities of affinity based on physiochemical laws. Its members are
that of already existing dynamic matter entering and exiting the system, changing and
transforming due to formation and degradation from external and internal influences.
A twist on the myth of the Ship of Theseus84 allows for illustration of how
mechanistic and vitalistic perspectives can be married to produce a better
understanding of development and evolution of life. This holds a place for specificity
and information as equally important in the descriptive process. In ‘The logic of
metabolism and its fuzzy consequences’ Danchin and Sekowska use the myth of the
Ship of Theseus to illustrate “the border between permanence and change” that is
key to metabolic processes as well as life. An explication of the physical process of
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“The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the
Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed,
putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the
philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and
the other contending that it was not the same.” Myth originally from Plutarch, 75 ACE; translated by John Dryden,
1994; as cited in (Danchin & Sekowska, p. 19)
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altering a ship may help garner an understanding of how information and specificity
can be integrated for a more comprehensive conceptualization of complex dynamic
processes in which life presents itself.
This is an explanation concerning persistence and transitions of life, not
formation of life in the universe. It will be accepted life is the product of a complex
evolutionary past that cannot be definitively known, which occurred through purely
physical processes. A twist on the myth of the ship of Theseus will illustrate how
perturbation to a system over time may change the physical form while maintaining
coherence and continuity of a system; how specificity and information can integrate
to dictate stability of a system while its physical constitution changes. The order
within the ship is akin to information, defined by Wiener as negative entropy. The
components forming the order can be correlated to specificity as outlined by Weiss.
With the interaction of the vitalistic and the mechanistic a more coherent conception
of life can occur.
The ship in this illustration is dry docked but cared for in a similar manner as
Theseus’ ship, and can be paralleled to a caterpillar. Reconstruction of the ship is its
processes of life. As planks of the ship decay and are removed, pitch from within
these planks are collected to be used as resin, to caulk addition of new planks. This
can be correlated with metabolic processes where macromolecules are cleaved, and
the resultant products are appropriated into other parts of the system. A new plank is
added for each removed. This is akin to the appropriation of nutrition by the
caterpillar, to sustain the processes of life the physical components must be added.
The waste of the ship is used for fertilizer, the nutrients of which help an orchard to
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grow that will be used as timber. All life produces waste that enriches the
environment and other life forms. If those rebuilding the ship found because of a shift
in the climate while altering the hull, it was needed to build walls to the ground,
changing form to a barn. Organization is shifted, but maintains the same level of
quantifiable order, information. Caterpillar becomes a chrysalis. Time passes and
planks are continually added and rot. Those salvaging the ship are put under pressure
by invaders and the shape of the barn slowly transforms into a church. A butterfly is
produced. Again the level of order is maintained within the system while its physical
manifestation changes over time, due to specific physical pressures and availability of
resources. While the structure is being restored, it lives. A fire strikes the orchard,
and no trees remain to form planks. The boat can no longer be restored its parts
decay, becoming incorporated by other ordered systems. The butterfly dies, and
enriches the environment.
Within this description there is allowance for order, transformation, and
generation. Despite alteration of its physical components an aspect of the ship
maintained the same; “The mysterious attribute lies in the information carried by the
relationships that link the planks together.”85 This statement seems inherently
vitalistic. When taken with understanding information in this sense can be equated
with negative entropy in the mathematical theory of communication as quantifiable
order of a system, which is driven by mechanistic physiochemical interactions of
specificity as outlined by Weiss. The level of order or information persists while the
atomistic parts change through time. No physical entity is static, all life is a process
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of breaking down and building organized structure driven by time and chemical
affinity. “In a way, not so different form the build up of man-made crafts such as
Theseus’ boat, atoms are combined into all the components of life, following certain
informational rules. Obeying these rules, however cannot be strictly accurate. They
have a fuzzy character associated to the inevitable thermal fluctuations.”86
Taking the view of organism as structure, giving equal weight to both the
vitalistic nature of genetic information and mechanistic nurture of physiochemical
specificity, may lay the ground for a new description of life and its processes; such as
that of the developmental system, or co-constructing lock and key as object of inquiry
based on cycles of contingency dictated by purely physical processes. This formulation
of organismal life, if adopted into the system of science may produce questions, thus
epistemic goals that do not rely on dichotomous distinctions. With a new metaphor
that does not imply primacy of vitalism or mechanism, a greater understanding of
organisms and life could be conceptualized by science and thus society. We may
finally be able to bury the horse.
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Molecular Ecology
To speak symbolically of "affinities," is merely to outline the problem, not to attack it. It remains to
resolve the described bio- logical phenomena into known phenomena of physical and chemical order. How such
resolution could be envisaged will be indicated in the following. It will be essentially an elaboration of an earlier
similar attempt to interpret cellular affinities in terms of molecular structure and organization.
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By way of preparation, it seems appropriate to transcribe the symbolic concepts of "cell" and
"protoplasm" into terms of molecular phenomena. This transcription has a purely pragmatic purpose, namely, to
create a more workable model of the cell. Its utility will soon become evident. It has led me to introduce a concept
of the cell which can best be characterized as "Molecular Ecology." That is, a cell is to be viewed as an organized
mixed population of molecules and molecular groups of the following properties and behavior.
(1) Each population is made up of molecular species of very different composition, sizes, densities, rank, and
stability, from trivial inorganic compounds to the huge and highly organized protein systems. Some segments of
these populations occur in relatively constant "symbiotic" groupings, often of a limited size range; these form the
various particulates of the cell content.
(2) It is one of the fundamental characteristics of cellular organization that the various species constituting the
population are not self-sufficient, but depend in various degrees upon other members of the population as well as
upon the physical conditions prevailing in the space they occupy. Survival and orderly function of the total
population are predicated on the presence of all essential members in definite concentrations, combinations, and
distributions.
(3) In view of this intricate interdependence, given molecular species can exist and given interactions between
species can occur only within a certain limited range of conditions specific for each kind. We might call these
conditions the "existential and operational pre- requisites" for each molecular species or group. The probability of
members of a given species to persist, hence to be found, in any but the appropriate setting, would be extremely
low.
(4) If the specific existential and operational prerequisites for the various molecular species and groups differ at
different sites of the cell, different species will automatically become segregated into their appropriate ecological
environments. As a result, even a wholly indiscriminate mixture can become sorted out into a definite space
pattern. Certain species will assemble in relatively stable combinations, like biotic groups, while others, mutually
incompatible, will separate.*
(5) While the conditions and forces which determine the molecular regrouping are of the most diverse sortselectric charges, surface tensions, coacervation, solubility, chemical affinities, adsorption, enzyme-substrate
relations, mobility, elasticity, etc.-their resultant in each case is of such character as to insure relative stability of
composition, density, and localization of the given group of species. As they combine, larger units of
supramolecular, submicroscopic, and finally, of microscopic order arise, each durable or "viable" only in a
particular typical constellation of conditions.
(6) Organization in space of the content of the cell, and of any of its constituent particulate elements as well,
therefore, presupposes a primordial system of spatially organized "conditions" to set the frame for the later
differential settlement of different members of the dispersed molecular populations. Such conditions can
presumably only exist in systems with stability like solids. Systems answering this demand are presented by all
surfaces and interfaces in the cell, which include the interfaces between one cell and another, between cell and
medium, nucleus and cytoplasm, nudeolus and nuclear sap, chromosomes and nuclear matrix, chromatic and
achromatic substance, as well as between all other formed cell components and the interstitial fluid.
(7) A given surface area of given constitution will therefore favor the adsorption of a given assortment of
molecular species, which will thus concentrate in that area and thereby crowd out other species not equally fit to
occupy that particular zone. In this manner, the various surfaces will gradually become settled by mosaics of
"frontier populations" recruited from the subjacent territories. **
(8) Owing to their frontier position, these surface populations acquire a unique role in determining the subsequent
course of events in the interior. Without necessarily being morphologically distinct, they assume the functional
properties of membranes. That is, they control the selective transfer of substances and energy between the
molecular realms they divide.
(9) Polar molecules (e. g., the biologically prominent lipoproteins), in becoming fixed to an interface, are forced
into a definite orientation relative to that interface, and hence, relative to one another. This orderly array makes it
possible for the resulting polarized layer to serve now, in its turn, as a new surface along which further molecular
layers from the interior can become fixed, with the selection depending on the physical and chemical properties of
the free ends of the righted molecules of the first layer. Thus, a stacking up process is initiated through which
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organization can be gradually extended into the interior, creating an increasing diversity of conditions as it
proceeds.
(10) If the conditions along an interface change in such a manner that the new conditions are no longer
compatible with the continued existence of the old frontier population, the latter will be crowded out by a new
assortment of species better fitted to the new situation. As this new frontier population settles in the controlling
master position, it sets a new master pattern for the events in the interior, causing the further fate of the cell to
take a radically different turn. Different contact surfaces can thus entail qualitative changes in the cell by bringing
different segments of the molecular population into the controlling surface positions. The concept formulated in
these ten points takes into account the growing realization that the structural and working order of the cell is
based not on the presence of a fixed mechanical framework pervading it-abundantly disproved by the facts-but on
a regular distribution in space of the various intracellular processes: a dynamic rather -than static skeleton,
maintained by metabolic energy and determined in its characteristics by some definite geometrical order in the
field of its operation. This order we conclude to be an order of "conditions," going back in last analysis to the
typical organization of surfaces-"organization" in this sense referring to the particular non-random distribution of
physical and chemical properties (see later). Pending evidence to the contrary, it is also possible to view the
organization of genes as residing in their surface properties. In other words, the organization pattern of many, and
perhaps all, living systems can be derived from a two-dimensional ground plan to which the third dimension is
secondarily added by the selective stacking-up of various polar compounds in consecutive layers.

*We are omitting here from consideration the fact that many large organic molecules, such as the native proteins,
seem to undergo constant metabolic renovation, exchanging constituents with their environment, but preserving
their identity.' In terms of our analogy, this is the counterpart of the turnover of cells within the individual
members of an animal population.
** Again for the sake of simplicity, we are ignoring here the fact that specific local conditions favor not only the
adsorption of certain existing molecular species, but synthesis of new species as well. This point will be more fully
discussed in a later section.
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